Student Papers in Public Policy
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 1

The Use of Social Media by Terrorists
Jan Balk
Purdue University, jbalk@purdue.edu

Benjamin Clarke
Purdue University, clarke34@purdue.edu

Charles Stembler
Purdue University, cstemble@purdue.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/sppp

Recommended Citation
Balk, Jan; Clarke, Benjamin; and Stembler, Charles () "The Use of Social Media by Terrorists," Student
Papers in Public Policy: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/sppp/vol3/iss1/1

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries.
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

Policy Brief

The Use of Social Media by Terrorists
Jan Balk, Benjamin Clarke, & Charles Stembler | Purdue University
HONR 399: Security, Technology, and Society | Spring 2021
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Introduction
With the rise of digital technology, particularly social media, terrorist groups have gained a valuable new
tool for furthering their goals. Terrorist propaganda, for the purposes of this brief, is defined as any video,
picture, post, or any other form of media posted to the internet to further the cause of the terrorist
organization, such as recruitment or communication with followers around the world. The manipulation of
technology by non-state actors is not a new phenomenon; however, social media and other new digital
technologies have proven a valuable resource for many terrorist organizations. Not only have terrorist
groups been adept in using new technologies such as Twitter, Bitcoin, and small drone aircraft, but the use
of new technologies has also fundamentally changed their methods of operation [1]. This issue leads us to
ask how the interaction between terrorist groups and emerging digital technologies has created challenges
in the counterterrorism landscape of the twenty-first century? In this brief, we specifically address these
three questions: (1) how have terrorist groups used social media to further their causes, (2) how has the
use of social media changed the operating nature of these groups, and (3) what are
governments doing to protect against it? We also suggest policy to counter this
emerging threat.

Current Policy
While social media platforms, such as Twitter, actively work to ban
accounts spreading terrorist propaganda, there are accounts or
messages that are missed. Currently, most governments rely on
these platforms self-policing and the companies themselves are
largely shielded from legal risk if their services are used for
nefarious purposes. In the United States, this regulation occurs
under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act [2]. Large
social media companies rely primarily on automated and manual
content moderation, done by the community and professional
moderators.
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In Canada [3] and the European Union [4], a
stricter requirement is imposed that content be
immediately removed; failure to do so can lead
to legal action. Other methods, such as countermessaging, have been attempted on a small
scale, such as the U. S. State Department’s
“Think Again, Turn Away” program [5], but found
limited effectiveness. The current policy
consisting mainly of in-platform content
moderation efforts prevents mainstream social
media from becoming a major propaganda
outlet, but many other channels are still
available to terrorists on these platforms.

Risks, Benefits, and Ethical
Considerations
Unlike traditional methods, terrorists’ social
media use has the potential to reach or influence
a far larger number of people, as an estimated
3.96 billion people use social media [6]. This
potential audience presents a massive risk,
leaving a huge number of people susceptible to
radicalization. In addition to mainstream social
media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and
Instagram, there are many lesser-known forms
of social media, including the dark web. All of
these can be dangerous when used by terrorists.
For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), used a mobile app called “Dawn of Glad
Tidings” to not only update followers but hijack
their twitter accounts for propaganda purposes
[5]. All of these strategies come together to
allow terrorist propaganda to propagate,
increasing the likelihood that it reaches
individuals vulnerable to radicalization, who may
then support the terrorist cause. Additionally,
there is risk of the terrorist message becoming
normalized, granting the group additional
legitimacy.

While dangers of social media are often
discussed, it has numerous benefits to society in
its relatively short existence. There may be a
temptation to eliminate or restrict it heavily but
would be counterproductive and remove many
of the benefits, discussed below. A social media
benefit is that it has enabled almost every person
to connect with a wider range of people. This
connection has manifested in the formation of
communities enjoyed by millions, built around
common interests, from television series to
astrophysics, which has positive effects on
mental health [7]. Additionally, it has
empowered small businesses by reducing the
cost of targeted advertising [8] and provided
individuals with ways to accelerate their careers
through sites like LinkedIn.
Content moderation on social media also
comes with unique ethical considerations. The
most discussed is large companies’ power to
restrict individual access to the global exchange
taking place on social media. It can often be
necessary for companies to take action when
dangerous content is being spread. Many people
do not trust for-profit corporations to police
speech, particularly regarding domestic matters;
between July 2020 and January 2021 Twitter
banned 70,000 accounts affiliated with “QAnon”
[9]. “QAnon” is a collection of conspiracy
theories holding, among other things, that
former President Trump was battling a secret
group of elites who control the U.S. government.
This situation was further complicated when
former President Trump was banned from
Twitter after the attack on the U.S. Capitol on
January 6, 2021. This action raises concerns
about who has the power to deny social media
usage, as it becomes a more critical form of
communication.
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Associated Costs
Any response to the use of social media by
terrorists carries with it a set of costs. These
costs can come in many forms, such as societal,
financial, and political. A policy which is more lax
on this issue would incur costs associated with
the increased success of terrorist propaganda.
This “success” includes financial costs for
security from this new threat, societal cost in the
form of exposing civilians to radicalization, and
political cost in the form of the government
appearing weak. Being too aggressive entails
risks of its own, however. One concern intrinsic
to the regulation of speech, particularly of
citizens, is that of government overreach and the
formation of a “big-brother” or “police” state. In
addition to content moderation being fairly
expensive [10], free speech and expression is a
cornerstone of Western identity. Governments,
such as China’s, have implemented expansive
social monitoring programs that make it far
easier to regulate the behavior of its citizens, but
this is often not done in good faith [11].
Programs monitoring civilians have faced strong
criticism in the U.S., and it is likely that any
expansion in surveillance would prompt
widespread repercussions, which is a huge
political cost to consider.

Policy Alternatives and
Recommendations
As previously discussed, stopping terrorist
propaganda online is very difficult. Of the 4.2
billion social media accounts in the world [12], it
is practically impossible to monitor every
account, view every post, and watch every video
on social media. The United States government
understands this is a daunting task. Additionally,
the government is also required to respect the
First Amendment and free speech, and the

values embodied therein. One alternative to the
current policy is to increase the accountability of
social media companies. For example, there is
some discussion that social media companies
should be charged with Aiding and Abetting with
regards to terrorist propaganda online, if they
allow it to be spread on their platforms.
Essentially, this means that, in addition to the
Communications Decency Act, social media
companies could be held responsible for
assisting terrorist groups to spread violent
messages if companies are found to be aiding
this behavior, including through intentional
negligence. While it could be difficult to prove
that companies knew about certain content, it
stiffens the penalty that companies could incur,
which would provide a stronger incentive to
police content on their platforms.
“Imposing responsibility on social media
companies punishes their hesitation to
self-censor and the facilitation of terrorist
activity which follows. Aiding and abetting
provides the best conduit for implementing
liability against social media companies
because it focuses on the “facilitation” role
their lack of self-censorship plays in the
promotion of (terrorist content)…In
essence, holding social media companies
responsible through aiding and abetting
would copy the changes made in the U.S.
for the Communications Decency Act.” [13]

Conclusion
The danger posed by terrorists using social
media to augment their capabilities is clear.
While the United States and other Western
nations have been somewhat successful in
combating the spread of dangerous online
content, there is still much work to be done. As
laid out in this brief, the solution to this problem
must be nuanced enough to remove dangerous
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content while respecting the civil liberties that
have become core to Western identity. This
solution likely has elements of increased
regulation and accountability for the providers
of these novel digital services. Additionally, a
solution also involves elements of increased use
of these same technologies against terrorist
groups. In successfully implementing improved
policy to match the dangers posed by social
media there are clear benefits to a nation’s
security, society, and economy, making this
implementation imperative.
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